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ABSTRACT: With respect to past wisdom about conflict resolution, 
Galtung suggested an important innovation: according to him, a conflict 
is essentially composed by three aspects A-B-C, i.e. Assumptions, Be-
haviour and Contradiction. These aspects are here defined in a more 
accurate way so as to make them independent of one another. Three 
representative theories of micro, meso and macro conflicts respectively 
– i.e. Freud’s theory of intimate conflicts, Marx’s theory of social conflicts, 
and Clausewitz’s theory of war conflicts – are interpreted through im-
proved definitions of A, B and C, which moreover bring a new light to 
these theories; in particular, they emphasize the three actors in each 
kind of conflict. In sum, through A-B-C, one is capable to properly in-
terpret conflicts at all social levels. A further suggestion of Galtung’s was 
to summarize all possible motivations of the aspect A. Whereas he 
characterized these two dichotomies by means of only some interper-
sonal features, I characterize them in structural terms; i.e. the kind of 
life-goal (infinity) and the kind of organization of life (authoritative law 
or freedom). These dichotomies are traced back to Leibniz’s two laby-
rinths of human mind. Remarkably, each of the aforementioned theories 
is based on choices on the two structural dichotomies which are the 
alternative ones to the choices that the dominant, violent theory of 
conflict resolution is based on at the corresponding levels. From the 
aforementioned theories, an alternative model of conflict resolution is 
obtained in a parallel way to what was obtained inside the set of all 
scientific theories. In this model, the alternative choice on the kind of 
organization implies the use of non-classical logic. In fact, all the above 
three theories rely on non-classical logic, manifested in the original texts 
by their use of doubly negated propositions. In particular, the word 
non-violence, by including two negated words, is recognised to be the 
proper word for characterizing the alternative conflict resolution. As an 
application of this general model of conflict resolution, a six-step 
1 This contribution improves the contents of the previous papers: “A paradigm 
shift in conflict resolution. War and peace from a history of science viewpoint”, P. 
Koller, H. Puhl (Eds.): Current Issues in Political Philosophy. 19th Int. Wittgenstein Sym-
posium, Kirchberg, 1996, pp. 106-114; “Non-violence as a science of conflict resolution”, 
Anuvibha Reporter, Dec. 2000, 5, pp. 111-116; “The rational structure of the non-violent 
worldview”, in G. Gasser et al. (Eds.): Culture: Conflict – Analysis – Dialogue. 29th Int. 
Wittgestein Symposium, vol. 14, ALWS, Kirchberg, 2006, pp. 79-81; “Galtung’s theory 
of conflict resolution and beyond”, Asteriskos, no. 3 and 4 (2007), pp. 17-31; and “The 
birth of Non-violence as a Political Theory”, Gandhi Marg, 29 no. 3, Oct.-Nov. 2007, 
pp. 275-295. 
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method for non-violently resolving conflicts at the interpersonal level 
– a level not considered by the above theories – is suggested. 
KEYWORDS: Conflict resolution, Galtung’s A-B-C, Two dichotomies, 
Alternative motivations, Doubly negated propositions, Non-violence, 
Theory of the interpersonal conflicts. 
La millora del model A-B-C de galtung envers una teoria 
científica per a tota mena de conflictes
RESUM: En relació a la saviesa anterior sobre la resolució de conflictes, 
Galtung va suggerir una innovació important; segons aquest autor, un 
conflicte està essencialment format de tres aspectes A-B-C, és a dir, 
Assumpcions, Conducta (behaviour en anglès) i Contradicció. Aquí 
definirem aquests tres aspectes de manera més acurada per tal de 
mostrar-los independents l’un de l’altre. Tres teories representatives dels 
conflictes micro, meso i macro, respectivament –és a dir, la teoria dels 
conflictes interns de Freud, la teoria dels conflictes socials de Marx, i la 
teoria dels conflictes bèl·lics de Clausewitz– s’interpreten a través de les 
definicions millorades d’A, B i C, que a més aporten nova llum a aques-
tes teories; en concret, emfatitzen els tres actors en cada mena de 
conflicte. En resum, a través del model A-B-C, podem interpretar millor 
els conflictes a tots els nivells socials. Un altre suggeriment de Galtung 
va ser el resum de totes les motivacions possibles de l’aspecte A. Mentre 
ell va caracteritzar aquestes dues dicotomies en termes de només algu-
nes propietats interpersonals, aquí les caracteritzarem en termes estruc-
turals; és a dir, el tipus d’objectiu vital (l’infinit) i el tipus d’organització 
vital (llei autoritària o llibertat). Aquestes dicotomies s’originen en els 
dos laberints de la ment humana de Leibniz. Notablement, cadascuna 
de les teories mencionades es basa en les eleccions sobre les dues dico-
tomies estructurals que són alternatives a les eleccions en què es basa 
la teoria dominant i violenta de la resolució de conflictes als nivells 
corresponents. De les teories mencionades, s’obté un model alternatiu 
de resolució de conflictes de manera paral·lela al que es va obtenir dins 
el conjunt de totes les teories científiques. En aquest model, l’elecció 
alternativa sobre el tipus d’organització comporta l’ús de la lògica no 
clàssica. De fet, les tres teories mencionades se sustenten sobre la lògi-
ca no clàssica, manifestada en els textos originals a través de l’ús de 
proposicions amb doble negació. En concret, la paraula no violència, 
en incloure dues paraules negatives, es reconeix com la paraula apro-
piada per caracteritzar la resolució alternativa de conflictes. Com a 
aplicació d’aquest model general de la resolució de conflictes, se sug-
gereix un mètode de sis passos per a la resolució no violenta de conflic-
tes a nivell interpersonal –un nivell que no es considera en les tres teo-
ries mencionades.
PARAULES CLAU: Resolució de conflictes, model A-B-C de Galtung, 
dues dicotomies, motivacions alternatives, proposicions amb doble 
negació, no violència, teoria dels conflictes interpersonals.
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1. The notion of a conflict and its useful limitations
Many scholars are distrustful of the notion of “conflict” because 
its content is too wide; it ranges from intimate conflicts –e.g. dilem-
mas– to conflicts at interpersonal, social, international and civiliza-
tion levels. No other notion claims to cover so complete a general-
ity, apart from intentionally indefinite words such as the word 
“thing” is. 
Nevertheless, one may accept the lesson coming from the intro-
duction of the word “set” in the most accurate field of human think-
ing, Mathematics. Also a set refers to all mathematical notions. Its 
inventor, Cantor, admitted that it is so general a notion to allow 
even for contradictions. However, these contradictions have been 
avoided by the introduction of some constraints on its use (see e.g. 
Russell’s type theory2). 
By learning the lesson coming from this intellectual experience, 
as a first constraint to the notion of conflict, I limit it at the aim to 
achieve a resolution; hence, rather than conflicts, I will deal with 
conflict resolutions. 
I suggest a second constraint concerning the method of resolution. 
In the case we allow violence, there is no limitation to the means 
and outcomes of the conflict; indeed, even the brutal suppression 
of the adversary and also the suppression of the conflict itself are 
allowed; hence, the number of resolution tools is infinite, and hence 
it results to be as indefinite to our reason. In such a case, no theoriz-
ing on conflict resolution is possible – and actually useful, since the 
conflict is easily resolved by practical tools; e.g. recall Alexander the 
Great cutting the Gordian knot by means of the sword. Instead, it 
is well known that necessity is the mother of invention; even more 
this dictum is true when one tackles a conflict without making use 
of tools allowing to suppress the conflict itself. 
In sum, I suggest the limitation to resolve the conflict without 
arriving to suppress the adversary. In the language of game theory,3 
we abandon the zero-sum games; they represent a totally asymmet-
ric victory, as it occurs in the animal kingdom. Instead, conflicts in 
the human kingdom are usually resolved in a different way, which 
2 For an introduction to such a subject see e.g. H. Meschkowsky: Evolution of Math-
ematical Thought, Holden-Day, San Francisco, 1965, and M. Kline: The Loss of Certainty, 
Oxford U. P., Oxford, 1980.
3 For a clever introduction to game theory, see A. Rapoport: Strategy and Conscience, 
Harper, New York, 1964.
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may be interpreted by a variety of non-zero-sum games; these games 
also include resolutions of a non-violent kind, according to which 
both opponents win. 
In my opinion, the most relevant suggestions for theorizing on 
conflict resolution (hereafter, CR) have been suggested by the theo-
rists sharing a non-violent attitude. Both Tolstoy and Gandhi4 
started this theorization under the ethical imperatives of their respec-
tive religions, reformed in their basic tenets; hence they theorized 
conflicts in subjective terms. In the seventies, Gene Sharp made a 
Herculean effort to collect historical and sociological evidence of all 
non-violent actions effectively performed inside whatever conflicts; 
he obtained almost innumerable kinds of such actions (actually, 
198). As a consequence, he suggested an objective representation of 
a non-violent CR.5 In the same years, Galtung introduced some 
theoretical notions –we will see them in the next section– which 
started a structural6 theory of a non-violent conflict resolution.7 
Rather than choosing a preferred theorist –in other terms, prefer-
ring a CR interpretation in either subjective or objective or struc-
tural terms–, it is necessary to improve, in my opinion, the struc-
tural suggestions so as to include and jointly integrate the previous 
suggestions in view to formulate a general theory of non-violent conflict 
resolution. 
I will show that Galtung’s structural suggestions represent a first 
step towards a complete theory of non-violent CR. By exploiting 
also a structural parallelism with the theories of the “hard” science, 
I will offer seven improvements for Galtung’s suggestions.
2. A first suggestion of Galtung’s of a structural nature: 
A conflict as an A-B-C 
Galtung first succeeded to offer a non-tautological definition of 
conflict. His definition includes three mutually interacting aspects 
at the same time. I temporarily define them as Assumptions, Behav-
4 L. Tolstoy: The Kingdom of God Is Within You (orig. 1894) several editions on in-
ternet. M.K. Gandhi: All Men are Brothers. Life and Thoughts of Mahatma Gandhi As Told 
In His Own Works, Unesco, Geneva, 1969. 
5 G. Sharp: The Politics of Non-violent Action, Porter Sargent, Boston, 1973. 
6 For instance, a mouse and a whale are very different animals in both their dimen-
sions and their shapes; yet from a scientific point of view they share the same basic 
feature, to be mammalians.
7 J. Galtung (1996): Peace by peaceful means, Pluto, London, 1996, §. 2.1.2.
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iour and Conflict. They can be pictured as three vertices of a triangle 
(Fig. 1).
Galtung’s definition of conflict as a triad A-B-C means that: 
1)  In the case of a violent resolution, the traditional approach –
motivated by a monist view of life– does not want to pay the 
cost of considering the complexity of the three aspects of a 
conflict. Indeed, the monist conception of a CR (to appeal or 
compel to either Unity or Truth or Justice) urges to quickly force 
the resolution of a conflict in order to achieve a pre-established 
unity. Also a dualistic conception of a conflict (e.g. proletariat/
capitalism, minor/major8) usually leads to a final result of a 
monist kind, even through the final elimination of the opposi-
tion (if not the opponent). Actually the traditional attitude of 
the monist or dualistic kinds understands the process of CR as 
a way to force the opponent to enter in a pre-established path. 
Galtung’s definition constitutes a decisive intellectual step 
ahead. It affirms that a conflict does not pertain to either a 
monist or a dualist conception of life, because it is an A-B-C.
2)  A conflict, when suitably tackled in its entirety, i.e. by embrac-
ing all its three aspects, is a plain affair, similar to learning the 
ABC in a primary school. 
8 See e.g. P. Patfoort: Uprooting Violence: Building Nonviolence. Cobblsmith, Freeport 
MA,1995.
A
CB
Fig. 1: Galtung’s definition of conflict
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3)  Galtung’s suggestion differs from the common visions on con-
flicts as it requires a more complex understanding than the 
usual one; it concerns three aspects co-existing inside an idea 
(conflict). This suggestion was a consequence of his non-violent 
attitude which cares for not only facts and feelings pertaining 
to the two opponents, but also for their basic motivations to 
solve their conflict.9 Indeed, before moving towards a resolu-
tion, a non-violent attitude completes the description of the 
situation by adding the intimate motivations.
4)  A process of non-violent CR is suggested by taking in account 
Assumptions, Behaviour and Contradiction, all to be suitably 
combined together. This innovation overcomes the rational-
ity of the violent attitude which, in order to rationally justify 
its final resolution of the conflict, has to appeal to only one 
of the three previous aspects; indeed, in a violent conflict, 
each of these aspects is enough to justify the suppression of 
the opponent, who is charged to be guilty as he either has 
committed evil actions (B), or is threatening the security of 
others’ lives (C), or has incompatible assumptions with those 
of the winner (A). On the other hand, a consensual CR cannot 
be achieved by only clever assumptions (A), only good actions 
and benevolent words (B), and even less only best feelings.
5)  In order to obtain a resolution constituting a victory for both 
parties, the three aspects have to be all considered as mutually 
interacting. Even two of the three aspects are not enough, as is 
shown by considering the following strategies: i) to free one’s 
own feelings in order to denounce the most easily remembered 
facts; ii) to be moved by an emotional viewpoint in the aim of 
either justifying or rejecting objective facts; iii) to appeal to one’s 
own assumptions which are covered by strong emotions, as 
military people do when they go to war; iv) to judge from some 
high principles the facts performed by the two opponents dur-
ing the conflict.
9 At a methodological level, his innovation was illustrated by J. Galtung: Theory 
and Methods of Social Research, Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, 1967, presenting social sci-
ence as a triad, i.e. Observations, Theory and Values; the third element constituting 
his innovation, as Assumptions do in CR. 
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3. First improvement: new definitions for Galtung’s A, B 
and C
Unfortunately, a few times Galtung offered definitions of the na-
ture of the notions A, B and C: he indifferently called them “aspects”, 
“elements”, “dimensions”. In addition, he offered a few definitions 
of their contents which turn out to be not the same in his different 
writings.10 
I want to suggest more accurate definitions of Galtung’s A, B and 
C. I call them aspects of a conflict. 
About their contents, I quote Galtung’s definitions of A, B and C 
from the aforementioned book; then I add my modifications. 
A: “Assumptions (cognitions)... attitudes, (emotions)”. Really, these 
words mix ethical issues (i.e. assumptions, attitudes) with some is-
sues (i.e. cognitions, emotions) belonging to a psychological domain.
My definition is the following one: A corresponds to Assumptions. 
C: Galtung understands the “Content” as “a contradiction... in-
volving... a goal”. 
Galtung’s word “contradiction” characterizes the conflict through 
emotional issues belonging to the subjective domain; it represents 
an incompatibility phenomenon at “the theoretical, inferred, sub-
conscious level”. Yet, he adds the notion of “goal”, apparently linked 
to the motivations. 
My definition: C corresponds to the emotional contradiction.
B: Galtung understands the “Behaviour” or the “Facts” as consti-
tuting the “Behaviour” or the “Facts”, constituting the “manifest, 
empirical, observed level” of the conflict. 
My definition is substantially the same: B corresponds to the objec-
tive domain of the facts related to a conflict.
10 J. Galtung: Peace..., op. cit. Even in his last book on conflict resolution – which 
seems to be the decisive one for completing his long reflection on this subject (J. 
Galtung: A Theory of Conflict. Overcoming Violence, Transcend U. P., Kolofon, Geneva, 
2010, pp. 27-28)–, he defines A-B-C in a different way: “A and B are party-oriented, C 
is goal-oriented. Our definitions pick up all three interpretations and could also be 
written: Conflict= Attitude +Behaviour + Contradiction. The goals are in A, the 
pursuit is in B, the actor is A+B, and the incompatibility in C. The opening definition 
links them with C as the root conflict in B, and A and B are meta-conflicts, metastases. 
This definition opens for A, B and C orientations in conflict for A, B and C phases in 
conflict dynamics and A, B and C approaches to conflict resolution. And indeed for A, 
B and C mistakes that distort conflict research, theory and practice.” In fn. 17 p. 268 
a “very short” definition preserves two aspects only, C (“incompatible “) and A (“goals”). 
Then, it is even more shortened in “contradiction in general”, i.e. C only. 
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My 1st improvement: From Galtung’s inaccurate definitions I 
retain the characteristic features of A-B-C as follows: A corresponds 
to the structural assumptions, B to the objective behaviour, and C 
to the experiencing of a subjective contradiction. 
This is a first result about the structural representation of conflicts; 
it attributes the same basic structure of three aspects to all conflicts.
4. Second improvement: From the three aspects to the 
three representations of a conflict. How they overcome 
the traditional wisdom on conflict resolution
Here I illustrate Galtung’s suggestion in terms that in my opinion 
are more sharply defined. It is well-known that in a conflict each 
opponent illustrates the dispute by means of an objective representa-
tion of his conflict, i.e. those hard facts that he would present to a 
Court or write in a report on the conflict; for example, bad actions, 
offensive behaviour, use of negative tools or weapons, etc. Let us 
consider these objective aspects as representing Galtung’s B.
The most clever analysts of a conflict add to this common, spon-
taneous representation, a subjective representation of the conflict, 
concerning the personal, subjective feelings and evaluations; in 
other words, this representation synthesises by means of subjective 
elements –i.e. intuitive ideas, slogans, emotions– all subjective facts 
involved in a conflict. Let us consider these subjective elements as 
representing Galtung’s C. 
The emphasis on A as an essential aspect of a conflict is in my 
opinion a major contribution of Galtung’s. In fact, this third aspect, 
by representing the basic attitude of a person involved in a conflict, 
plays a decisive role for obtaining both a consensual CR and a cor-
rect theorization of CR. As a fact, the word “Assumptions” includes 
in a simple, although in a highly synthetic way, the philosophical, 
intellectual, ethical and religious issues motivating an opponent; it 
also includes his basic needs, which many scholars consider as the 
only important assumptions to be taken into account. It is apparent 
that, owing to the high relevance of the aspect A for a successful 
solution of a conflict, this motivational aspect of the conflict matters 
as much as the objective one and the subjective one.
Also the past institutional wisdom on the kind of CR which does 
not suppress or oppress the opponent is less comprehensive than 
Galtung’s definition. The following table shows that some social 
institutions consider only one aspect of a conflict; some others only 
two; with none considering a conflict in its entirety. This table shows 
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the impressive improvement of Galtung’s suggestion with respect 
to past theoretical efforts of the social institutions built in order to 
solve conflicts (Table 1).
My 2nd improvement: In the new version of A-B-C, each of 
them originates a specific representation of the conflict at issue: 
motivational, objective and subjective representations.
5. Third improvement: Freud’s, Marx’s and Clausewitz’s 
theories interpreted by means of A-B-C. The three actors 
playing each of their conflicts
In order to verify that the new definition of A, B and C can start 
a general theory of CR, let us interpret by means of them the most 
celebrated theories of CR suggested by previous authors, i.e. Freud’s 
theory about interior conflicts, Marx’s theory about social (class) 
conflicts, and Clausewitz’s theory about military conflicts. They 
constitute the most representative conflict theories at the micro, 
meso and macro social levels, respectively. 
Table 1: THE MEANS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTIONS  
AND THEIR REPRESENTATIONS ACCORDING  
TO TRADITIONAL SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS
Social 
inStitutionS 
RepReSentation  
of a conflict thRough 
aSpectS of a conflict
a B c
Religion, 
Psychology
Feelings – – ⊕
Traditional 
political 
ideologies
Systems of Thought ⊕ – –
Sociology  Social Behaviours – ⊕ –
History Reports upon past events from 
an outside viewpoint
⊕ ⊕ –
Roman Law, 
Court
Application of fixed laws  
to facts
– ⊕ ⊕
Lineup in Court Overt debate on a quarrel ⊕ ⊕ –
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Freud’s psychoanalytic theory 
Let us remark that Freud’s psychoanalysis suggested a method of 
CR in opposition to the violent kinds of resolution practised at his 
time and also subsequently, i.e. containment measures of a men-
tally ill person, electroshocks and drugs altering the deep bases of 
his personality. Surely, such violent measures cannot suggest anything 
of the intimate dynamics of a person. In Freud’s theory, the resolu-
tion of a conflict is pursued by merging the conflict inside a positive 
human relation, i.e. dialogue, and inside this dialogue, by favouring 
a transfer Patient-Analyst. In other terms, Freud’s theory appears as 
an essentially non-violent theory of CR for intimate conflicts.
Freud’s psychoanalysis about interior conflicts implicitly sug-
gested the same three aspects of Galtung’s. Indeed, Freud’s work can 
be represented by means of the theoretical scheme in Figure 2, where 
each aspect of A, B and C is described by a different writing of Freud’s; 
his separated illustration of each aspect shows the traditional diffi-
culty in understanding three aspects inside a single idea, conflict. 
The motivational representation of a person’s inner conflict, A, is 
described by Freud’s methodological writings, which summarized 
his innumerable analyses of the illnesses of his patients; while the 
objective representation, B, is given by his description of the lapsus, 
the only acts objectively manifesting inner compulsions; the subjec-
tive representation of the conflict is given first of all by his book The 
Interpretation of Dreams, since the patient’s dreams may reveal his 
intimate experience (Fig. 2). 
Methodological 
writings
Lapsus
Dreams 
representation
FREUD’s theory of intimate conicts: The representations
Fig. 2: Freud’s three representations of the interior conflict
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The previous three representations of the interior conflict consti-
tute Freud’s deep conception of a personality. 
The case of Freud’s theory leads us to discover that also the num-
ber of actors of an intimate conflict is three and they also correspond 
to Galtung’s A-B-C. Indeed, the main result of Freud’s theory was to 
recognize inside each personality three independent actors, by him 
baptized as Id, Ego and Super-Ego; the assumptions A are mani-
festly the ideal values of the Super-Ego; whereas the Ego manages 
the objective behaviour B; and the Id is the permanent source of 
contradictions, C (Fig. 3). 
Yet, these three actors are not, of course, three persons, but only 
cultural creations for fixing our ideas in accurate terms; indeed, their 
interaction is enlightening the inner dynamics of human life. One 
can say that the Super-Ego enters in an intimate conflict by impos-
ing its Assumptions; it projects its principles without any settlement 
with the answers given by the reality, except to suspend these prin-
ciples when facing a negative reaction. The Ego practices its capabil-
ity of mediating between Super-Ego principles and Id compulsions 
manifested through both fancies and dreams during sleep. Ego’s 
failures are manifested by lapsus and mistakes. 
Whereas the Id is constitutionally incapable to organize any vision 
of the entire conflict and even less of the external reality, the Super-
Ego represents the conflict through what may be included by the 
applications of its principles. It is the Ego that is capable to achieve 
a rational re-construction of both the inside and outside situations, 
and hence also of a conflict, which –as Galtung suggests–, has to 
FREUD’s theory of intimate conicts: The actors
Super-Ego
Ego Id
Fig. 3. Freud’s three actors of the interior conflict
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include the above three representations. In sum, not all actors are 
capable to rationalize the intimate conflict. 
Marx’s theory of social conflict
In the history of society, the traditional conceptions for the reso-
lution of social conflicts all allowed the recourse to violent methods, 
even the suppression of the adversary. Yet, the conflict inside a fac-
tory constituted an exception, since the capitalist had to avoid the 
suppression of his adversary, the Proletariat, otherwise he would 
have to terminate his production of goods, and hence his earnings. 
Hence, the factory was the first social space where conflicts had to 
be solved without suppressing the weaker opponent. On the other 
hand, the workers fought the capitalist by means of strikes, whose 
first result was self-sufferance (i.e. lack of salary) and second result 
was only a soft boycott of capitalist’s interests.
Marx’s theory certainly constituted some understanding of social 
conflicts which was much more satisfactory than that of bourgeois 
ideology. In the latter, the notion of a conflict is pictured through 
no more than interpersonal relationships; it is conceived through 
ethical stereotypes (rebels, evil-minded persons, etc.); hence, class 
conflict is viewed in terms of a mere resistance of some workers to 
the growth of the capital.
According to Marx, the class conflict will be resolved by progress-
ing in the history of mankind to the next, unavoidable stage, char-
acterized by the Proletariat’s conquest of social power. This historical 
process will be accomplished by the working class by, first of all, 
achieving full consciousness of historical and social processes, hence 
a non-violent historical process. Marx’s slogan “Workers of the World, 
unite!” asked not for an immediate rebellion or the constitution of 
an army, but for the growth of the Proletariat’s awareness of the 
historical revolution, which, by propagating itself from a State to 
another, will change the history of mankind. This historical change 
will not necessarily occur in a violent manner. In fact, Marx, Engels 
and even Lenin never excluded the democratic resolution of the 
conflict, where the word “democratic” means a soft historical change 
by means of e.g. political elections. 
In sum, the resolution of the conflict in a factory elicited an ap-
proximately non-violent way to solve a social conflict. Unfortu-
nately none of the previous leaders knew the historical novelty of 
Gandhi’s methods and techniques to resolve mass conflicts, e.g. 
civil disobedience. This ignorance was partly compensated in sev-
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eral Western countries by the birth of trade unions, discovering in 
an experiential way new techniques and new methods of struggle, 
all of a non-violent kind.
Also Marx described the three aspects of the social conflict by 
means of three different kinds of writings. The Fragment on Machines 
constituted an attempt to analyse inside the perspective of a very 
advanced technological development what the Capital laws will be 
in the future. Through The Capital, Marx attempted to describe the 
objective historical dynamics of a society managed by the bourgeoi-
sie. The Parisian Manuscripts represented the Proletariat’s experience 
of the social contradictions, i.e. its subjectively suffering the struc-
tural oppression caused by the Capital mediated by the Bourgeoisie 
(Fig. 4).
Also Marx’s theory of social conflict presents three (social) actors; 
they are specific for this case of conflict: Capital, Bourgeoisie and 
Proletariat. They correspond to A, B and C; the Capital’s rule, leading 
the history of mankind, corresponds to A; the social contradictions 
suffered by the Proletarians owing to the social structure managed 
by the bourgeoisie corresponds to C; B correspond to the Bourgeoi-
sie’s application of capital laws to society, in particular to workers. 
The mutual interactions of these three actors generate the conflict-
ing dynamics of the entire society (Fig. 5). 
However, Marx’s theory remained incomplete. He had no time to 
specify the social processes by which the Proletariat’s awareness may 
grow, as well as to detail the historical change in social power. In 
addition, Marx emphasised the conflict inside a factory so much to 
MARX’ theory of social conicts: The representations 
Fragmenton 
Machines
“The Capital”
Parisian 
manuscripts
Fig. 4: Marx’s three representations of social conflict
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consider all other kinds of conflicts as depending from this one. No 
surprise if the Marxist movement on one hand ignored the per-
sonal conflicts by appealing to the obligations deriving from class 
struggle and, on the other hand, it was unable to adequately react 
to the conflict among nations, e.g. WW1; and later, being the Marx-
ist theorists unable to enlarge the received theory to include the 
international relationships, the victorious Russian revolution con-
fined the new historical advancement to one country only. 
Worse, even during Marx’s life, his theory was reduced to a repre-
sentation of the capitalist economy only; this is the well-known 
vulgar-economicistic theory inspiring the policy of Marxist move-
ment under Engels’ leadership.11 As a consequence, the civil society 
was disregarded; Marx’s theory was simplified as representing a 
conflict between two actors only, i.e. capitalism and proletariat; be-
ing the bourgeoisie conceived as a mere executor of capital laws. It 
resulted the usual dualist representation of a conflict, whose resolu-
tion was nothing else than the suppression of the other party. In 
this reduced version of Marx’s theory, only a violent revolution was 
possible. By reiterating the dominant theory of CR, the Marxist 
movement depicted its historical overcoming of the bourgeoisie 
11 Since Marx did not complete the edition of even the first book of the several 
times announced The Capital, F. Engels wrote his economicistic version of Marx’s 
theory in the well-known book: Anti-Duehring, 1878. In the preface, Engels claims the 
approval by Marx, but we know that at that time Marx’s subsistence depended on 
Engel’s donations.
MARX’ theory of social conicts: The actors
Capital
Bourgeoisie Proletariat
Fig. 5: Marx’s three actors of social conflict
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according to the dominant attitude in CR, i.e. in the crude terms of 
a violent revolution suppressing the adversary.
Notice that each actor of Marx’s theory of social conflict was rep-
resented by a corresponding specific group; the bourgeois class, the 
proletarian class and the capitalists. Each group had the capability 
of building a specific ideology from its own viewpoint correspond-
ing to A, B and C. Each specific ideology resulted to be completely 
different from that of the other two. The Capitalists produced an 
elementary theory of history, almost ignoring conflicts; they saw 
first of all an unbounded growth of the Capital on itself; hence they 
considered the history of society as a mere context, where the Pro-
letariat represented a merely refractory social group. 
The other two social groups, Bourgeoisie and Proletariat, rational-
ized their conflict in two opposite ways. The Bourgeoisie opposed 
to the Proletariat the unavoidable tradition of both the freedom of 
property and the freedom of enterprise, i.e. the characteristic features 
of Capitalism. Being the Marxist theory degenerated in preparing a 
violent revolution, it originated a disruptive class conflict. In the 
history of the last century and half, this conflict was so acute and 
widespread that it eventually produced world-wide a contraposition 
considered by the Marxist movement as a global war parted in so 
many pieces as the States were. Then this internal war in each state 
grew up to a confrontation between two world blocks of States 
threatening a nuclear destruction of mankind. This conflict was the 
most terrible one in the history of mankind; in fact, it was first of 
all an ideological conflict which even opposed two kinds of logic, 
the classical and the so-called dialectical one.
Incidentally, let us notice that the kind of structural linkage be-
tween the above two theories achieves a theoretical goal pursued for 
a long time, i.e. it suggests a substantial connection between the two 
“revolutionary” theories of the 19th century.
Clausewitz’s theory about military conflicts 
Surprisingly, even wars may be interpreted by means of Galtung’s 
suggestion, as the theorist of a war is motivated, rather than to win 
at all costs, to consider as his best victory that obtained either “with-
out fighting on the field” (Tzun Szu), or by having “saved men” 
(Lazare Carnot), or by preserving the relationship with civil society, 
in particular the government’s policy (Clausewitz). 
Notice that most share the attitude to solve conflict by violent 
means; they are so much fascinated by Clausewitz’s reference to the 
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explosion of violence on the field that they miss the rational actor, 
policy, so that they identify the commander’s strategy aimed to 
tackle the conflict as a planning of dualistic confrontation with the 
enemy.
In fact, Clausewitz declared that his strategic thinking on war is 
characterized by a “fascinating trinity”, i.e. chance, violence and 
politics. The following quotation illustrates the trinity which Clause-
witz conceived in representing a war:
“What is a war?... War is more than a mere chameleon that 
slightly adapts its characteristics to the given case. As a complete 
phenomenon, its dominant tendencies always make war a fascinat-
ing trinity, composed of: 1) primordial violence, hatred, and en-
mity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; 2) its aspect 
of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject 
to pure reason; and 3) the play of chance and probability, within 
which the creative spirit is free to roam.”
They correspond to the previous three aspects of Galtung’s defini-
tion of a conflict. The “violence” corresponds to the explosion of 
the contradiction (C); the “policy... subject to pure reason” corre-
sponds to A; the capability to tackle “chance and probability” inside 
the mediation between the previous two aspects, as well as all other 
aspects of the context of a war, correspond to B (Fig. 6). 
The following Clausewitz’ period presents the three actors of a war: 
The first of these three aspects concerns mainly the people; the 
second, the government; the third, the commander and his army. 
Violence  Creative  
mediation  
Policy
 
 
Fig. 6: The three representations of a war
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The passions that are to be kindled in war must already be inherent 
in the people; the political aims are the business of government 
alone; and the scope that the play of courage and talent will enjoy 
in the realm of probability and chance depends on the particular 
character of the commander and the army. These three tendencies 
are like three different codes of law, deep-rooted in their subject and 
yet variable in their relationship to one another. A theory that ignores 
any one of them or seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship among them 
would conflict with reality to such an extent that for this reason 
alone it would be totally useless. The task, therefore, is to keep our 
theory [of war] floating among these three tendencies, as the pen-
dulum floats among three points of attraction (Fig. 7).12 
No better confirmation of previous exploration of the improved 
suggestion of Galtung’s, i.e. a conflict as a triad A-B-C, could be 
imagined. 
Notice the last proposition: it declares Clausewitz’s purpose, i.e. 
he wants to tackle the trinity in its entirety, notwithstanding the 
three different viewpoints of the actors. This ambitious task resulted 
to be unsuccessful –the book is an amalgamation of separated max-
ims and reflections–; later, the exact content of his book resulted to 
be highly controversial. 
12 K. von Clausewitz: On War, Princeton U. P., Princeton, 1989, sect 1.1.28.
People  Commander  
Government  
Fig. 7: The three actors supporting a war
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Let us remark how difficult it was for the Western culture to accept 
the above three theories. They were all born in the 19th century, but 
were appreciated in their respective intellectual areas not before a 
century after. In fact, each of them opposed to the dominant attitude 
of suppressing the adversary in a conflict.
The applications of Galtung’s improved suggestion to the above 
three theories –ranging from the personal conflicts to the social and 
the interstate ones– is sufficient to prove that this suggestion ap-
propriately covers all kinds of conflicts. 
6. Fourth improvement: The Assumptions summarized 
by two dichotomies
A further crucial innovation of Galtung’s was in 1974 his sum-
marizing by means of two dichotomies the legion of motivations 
represented by A. One dichotomy concerns the choice between 
vertical interpersonal relationships and horizontal relationships; the 
other dichotomy being collective homogeneity and individual di-
versity.13 This innovation is of great importance since it radically 
changes the basic philosophical attitude, usually referring to a single 
idea, more or less widened or going to extremes, such as needs, 
causality, determinism, functionalism, etc. 
But subsequently he dismissed this innovation; he preferred to 
attribute the A-B-C to each of the different levels of a contradiction, 
i.e. either latent or manifest, either superficial or deep, etc.14 I recu-
perate Galtung’s intellectual structure of 1974; yet, whereas he de-
fined the dichotomies in subjective or interpersonal terms only,15 I 
will define them in the structural terms of a conflict.16
13 J. Galtung: “Social structure and  science  structure”,  International Journal of 
Critical Sociology, (1974) I, 1, pp. 93-125. “Revised version” in: Essays in Methodology, Ei-
jlers, Copenhagen, 1976, pp. 13-40. 
14 J. Galtung: Peace by Peaceful Means, op. cit., Sect. 1.3; Theory of Conflict, op. cit., 
p. 75.
15 J. Galtung: Ideology and Methodology, Eijlers, Copenhagen, 1976, sect. 1.3.
16 Independently, I obtained two parallel dichotomies from an improvement of 
the two interpretative analyses of the history of science, i.e. from Koyré’s From the 
Closed World to the Infinite Universe, U. Maryland P., Baltimore, 1959, and T.S. Kuhn: 
The Structure of the Scientific Theories, Chicago U. P., Chicago, 1969. In fact, both 
analyses deal with the conflicts between scientific theories or paradigms. See my paper: 
“What science for Peace?”, Gandhi Marg, 7, 1986, 733-742; “Koyré, Kuhn and beyond”, 
10th Logic, Meth. Phil. Sci., Firenze, 1995, p. 320 (abstract); “The several categories 
suggested for the “new historiography of science”: An interpretative analysis from a 
foundational viewpoint”, Epistemologia, 24 (2001) 48-82.
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Galtung’s dichotomies can be traced back to scientist-philosopher 
Leibniz’s thinking. He stressed “two labyrinths” of the human mind; 
they concern 
–  The infinity: either Actual Infinity (AI) or Potential Infinity (PI),
–  “either law or freedom”.
They correspond (admittedly, in a somewhat vague way) to the 
above two dichotomies. 
Leibniz was unable to decide whether his two labyrinths are solv-
able or not, either by an intellectual research or by an ethical act, as 
Galtung suggested; in this latter case they become dichotomies. 
I understand the former of the two labyrinths of Leibniz’s as a 
dichotomy representing the basic two aims of life, either to pursue 
a mythical, Absolute Interest (AI), or a Personalistic Interest (PI). More-
over, I understand the latter of Leibniz’s labyrinths as a dichotomy 
on the Organization of life, either an organization governed by Au-
thoritative leaders and/or laws (AO), or an organization of a group 
searching for a new method aimed to solve a Problem (PO). Again 
the correspondence with Galtung’s dichotomies is somewhat vague, 
owing to the variety of subjective representations of a structural 
feature.
In order to fix the structural meanings of the dichotomies, let us 
consider a well-known instance of a couple of choices on them, i.e. 
those representing the Military way to solve conflicts. It chooses the 
Absolute Infinity (AI) of an infinite race for achieving even more 
destructive weapons through the most advanced scientific research. 
Moreover, it chooses the authoritative organization of a staff-and-
line chain of command for imposing a compulsory behaviour to the 
troops (AO). 
My 4th improvement. I summarize all possible assumptions in A 
through the least number of them, yet by preserving their variety, 
in two; in addition, each of them is assumed to be a dichotomy. 
These two dichotomies introduce a basic structure of four possible 
couples of choices on them. In such a way each of the four possible 
couples of choices in the two dichotomies represents some minimal 
ethics, which is sufficient to tackle a conflict and moreover to plan 
the search for finding out its resolution. 
These two dichotomies also apply to the intellectual level of the 
above theories. On one hand, the dominant conflict theories choose 
the Absolute Infinity (AI) of the infinite progress of the Absolute 
Spirit, leading the history of mankind in an almost deterministic 
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way. On the other hand, the previous three conflict theories all 
choose the Personalistic Infinite, i.e. they want to increase the Pa-
tient’s life, the Proletariat’s social power, and the number of surviv-
als in combats (PI) respectively.17 On one hand, the dominant 
conflict theories choose the Authoritative Organization (AO, i.e. 
laws obtained by deduction from a priori principles); the previous 
three theories of CR –being all based on the problem of how to cure 
an interior conflict, how in the historical development of mankind 
the Proletariat will overcome capitalism, and how to link military 
fight with politics respectively–, developed as a search to find out a 
new method of resolution of the crucial problem, i.e. constituted as 
a Problem-based Organization (PO). 
These dichotomies also apply to the scientific theories. This fact 
is not surprising, since the scientific theories may also be considered 
as aimed to solve conflicts, i.e. the cognitive ones with Nature and, 
more in general, reality. Philosopher-scientist Leibniz referred to 
infinity as it is experienced both in life and in mathematical 
thought, where he invented the greatest advancement of all times, 
the infinitesimal analysis. Even on his deathbed, he was still dubi-
ous whether the correct basis of his invention was the potential 
infinity (PI) or rather the actual infinity (AI). At present, there are 
two main kinds of mathematics, i.e. constructive mathematics 
relying on PI and classical mathematics relying on AI. About the 
organization of a theory, the deductive one has been well-known 
since the times of Euclidean geometry. This organization is com-
monly considered as the only one that is adequate for a system-
atic organization of a scientific theory. Instead, non-deductive 
organisation is easily recognised in the original texts of several 
scientific theories –mainly those written by Lobachevsky, S. Carnot 
and Einstein when he suggested both the relativity theory and a 
“heuristic” theory on quanta;18 i.e., the founders of the “revolution-
ary” theories in the “hard” science– respectively, the first non-
Euclidean geometry, the first non-mechanical theory and the first 
non-classical theories in theoretical physics. These scientists 
wanted to solve a problem –how many parallel lines exist, what 
the best conversion of heat is in work, how to conciliate mechan-
17 Let us notice that the late Freud saw the Id as wavering between the two po-
larities of eros and thanatos (love and death); in such a way, he attributed to the Id the 
dichotomy on the Infinity, which actually pertains to the Super-ego. 
18 A. Drago: “There exist two models of organization of a scientific theory”, Atti 
della Fond. G. Ronchi, 62 n. 6, 2007, 839-856.
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ics with electromagnetism and how to describe light by means of 
discrete mathematics, respectively.
Notice that these two dichotomies concern not only the objective 
and structural levels, but also the subjective level, as expressed both 
by Galtung’s and Leibniz’s. 
These remarks suggest that, by qualifying the aspect A of a conflict 
through the above two dichotomies, we are founding a theory of CR 
according to all three kinds of representations of a conflict.
7. Fifth improvement: What about a conflict with a 
violent adversary? Two models of conflict resolution
My main criticism to Galtung’s suggestions is to have missed a 
crucial point of a theory of conflict resolution. Notice that only one 
kind of conflict is an intimate conflict; in each kind of conflict there 
are two opponents; he failed to specify what opponent the A-B-C 
triangle refers to. Each opponent experiences a contradiction; but 
surely each opponent experiences it in a different way. Hence, it is 
apparent that the notion of “contradiction” C has to be differently 
qualified in each one of the two opponents. Moreover, the opponents 
may have different, if not mutually divergent, assumptions. The 
behaviour B of each of the two parties is surely not the same as the 
other. 
By having missed the reference of the structure A-B-C for each 
opponent, Galtung proceeds by multiplying the application of A-B-
C to a series of elements of a conflict;19 yet, these applications of 
A-B-C may be a priori unbounded in number. In my opinion, to 
ignore this double content of each of the three aspects of a conflict 
obstructs a clear representation of a conflict both from the viewpoint 
of an outside observer, who cannot reduce his work by equating, or 
confusing, or mixing the different contents of each aspect pertaining 
to each opponent, and from the viewpoint of an opponent, who 
basically has to take in account his triplicate divergence with his 
opponent’s attitude.
I conclude that, in order to obtain a well defined theory, it is nec-
essary to attribute the three aspects A, B and C, to each opponent 
in a conflict. The result is a theory that is a bit more complex; by 
multiplying the three aspects of a conflict by two, the aspects to be 
taken into account are six. 
19 See e.g. J. Galtung: A Theory of Conflict, op. cit., p. 75. 
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Being the two dichotomies basic, the two basic choices on them 
shape a model of conflict resolution (MoCR), in short a particular at-
titude about CR. We then have four possible models of conflict 
resolution. Each opponent represents the conflict in question 
through his three specific levels of awareness: the motivational, the 
emotional and the factual aspects of his MoCR, respectively. 
The question now is what happens when the two opponents of a 
conflict pursue two different MoCRs. Let us consider the extreme 
situation of a confrontation between a non-violent person with a 
military person. Indeed, among the four MoCRs, two are the most 
relevant ones, i.e. the military MoCR, characterized by the choices 
AI&AO –a true paradigm in Kuhn’s sense, owing to its strong influ-
ence on society– and the non-violent MoCR, characterised by the 
choices PI&PO.20 
From the beginning of this paper, we have considered the option 
between violence or non-violence, which can also be described as 
the dichotomy between an increase in destructive tools, to the point 
of becoming insensitive to humanity, and an improvement of the 
personal relationships. We have thus the dichotomy on the Infinity 
(it may be intended also as Interest). 
–  The interPersonal Infinity (PI) of the non-violent method is an 
ever more personal involvement in the interpersonal relation-
ships to convert the opponent; it is also an ever increasing work 
for educating people.
–  The Actual Infinity of the infinite arms race, as in the Military 
case. 
As a result of previous sections, we have also defined a dichotomy 
about the organisation of society. It is between:
–  The Authoritarian Organization (AO) of the Military: staff and 
line, classical logic (i.e. friend or foe, either-or, all or none, de-
ductive arguing from fixed principles).
–  The Problem-based Organization (PO) of the non-violent theory: 
self-reliance, co-operative behaviour, attention to the ethical 
problems, non-classical logic (i.e. search for a third party, induc-
tive arguing, not-not). 
20  M. Nagler: “Peace as a Paradigm Shift”, Bull. Atomic Sci., 37, Dec. 1981, pp. 
49-52 cleverly paralleled the notion of paradigm in the history of science and the 
notion of paradigm in CR. 
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Manifestly, the two choices of violence and non-violence are mutu-
ally antithetic in nature in such an acute way that the corresponding 
two MoCRs become mutually “incommensurable” – by paralleling 
Kuhn’s terminology about conflicting scientific paradigms; in other 
terms, they do not have a common language a priori. The same occurs 
for the two choices on the other dichotomy. Thus, two MoCRs dif-
fering in their basic choices result to be mutually incommensurable.21 
As a first consequence of this incommensurability phenomenon, 
their MoCRs are different in an essential and irremediable way. As 
a second consequence, there is no hope to achieve a historical era 
of passive peace; the reality is composed by essentially different 
MoCRs; non-violence differs from pacifism, according to which one 
hopes for an undifferentiated society as representing a peaceful 
society. As a third consequence, one may approach a conflict in four 
radically different ways; this number of different approaches shows 
the great difficulty that one faces when one wants to theorize on a 
conflict without taking into account this variety of MoCRs. As a 
fourth consequence, a conflict between two parties constitutes a 
serious problem when no one withdraws from his couple of choices 
defining his MoCR. As a fifth consequence, a conflict between two 
opponents referring to two different MoCRs is rooted in reality and 
in their minds at the same time. As a sixth consequence, in the case 
an opponent changes his basic choices, he experiences a personal 
revolution, i.e. an inner change in his personality, although his 
everyday life does not change much; this change is similar to what 
is called a process of conversion in religious terms.22
As a specific effect of an incommensurability phenomenon, when 
a subjective notion –e.g. defence, co-operation, order, brotherhood, 
tools, human rights, authority, etc.– is shared by two MoCRs, it 
undergoes, owing to the antithetic nature of the two dichotomies, 
21 A. Drago: “Incommensurability as a bound of hermeneutics in science”, in M. 
Fehér, O. Kiss, L. Ropolyi (Eds.): Hermeneutics and Science, Kluwer Acad. P., 1999, 135-
155.
22 Let us consider an acute conflict between two opponents. Each opponent elicits 
the above three representations; hence, a conflict involves six different representations; 
moreover, each opponent may be either conscious or unconscious of each representa-
tion, namely 26 = 64 issues; last, but not least, any opponent may change his attitude 
in the time of the conflict; that may lead to 22 = 4 independent issues, which to-
gether with the previous ones amount to 256 different issues. At last one has to dis-
tinguish the three levels –micro, meso and macro–; the result is almost a thousand 
issues. Such a large number of issues shows the complexity of a conflict. No surprise 
if the scholars of CR present innumerable characteristic features of the conflicts. No 
surprise also if it was so difficult to achieve a general theory of CR. 
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a radical variation in meaning; the word is the same but in the two 
MoCRs the meanings are different. Hence, incommensurability phe-
nomena effectively separate the different four MoCRs, two by two, 
through not only the different choices but also the different mean-
ings of many notions. However, a patient and clever dialogue can 
build bridges to overcome the variations of meaning. 
The following table summarizes the main features of the two more 
relevant MoCRs. The issue of non-classical logic will be illustrated 
in the following section (Table 2). 
Table 2: THE TWO MAIN MODELS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION
a
effective 
RepReSentation
(the options 
shaping the 
solution)
c
SuBjective 
RepReSentation
(intuitive ideas for 
subjective 
thinking)
B
oBjective 
RepReSentation
(what textbooks 
present)
Military
MoCR
(the dominant 
one = a 
paradigm)
Abstract Increase 
in weapons (AI)
Authoritative 
Organization (AO)
Scientific 
strategy, security 
strength, to be 
first, authority, 
hierarchy, 
deterrence, 
enemy, traitor,
“Scientification 
of security and 
suppression of 
emotional drives”
Destructive tools
Compulsory 
behavior
Analytical mind
Hierarchical 
society
Classical logic 
(either A or 
not-A)
Non-violent
MoCR
Increase in 
Personal relations
(PI)
Organization 
for solving a 
universal Problem 
by means of 
a solidarity 
movement (PO)
Brotherhood, em-
pathy, equality, 
community, 
co-operation, 
non-violence,
pluralism, de-
mocracy,
“Democratization 
of defence and 
extinguishing vio-
lence”
Non-violent 
techniques
Human people’s 
rights
Community, 
co-operation
Holistic mind
Dialectical logic 
(not-not-A is not 
equivalent to A)
Time span some centuries some generations one generation
Legend: MoCR = Model or Conflict Resolution. 
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About the subjective representation, the two propositions between 
commas summarize the plethora of subjective terms that one can 
list for each actor.23 F. Fornari characterised the philosophies of the 
two MoCRs, represented by a military man and a conscientious 
objector – by means of two mottos: “Mors tua, vita mea” (Your death, 
my life) and “Mors mea, vita nostra” (My death, our life).24 
In a first approximation, these two MoCRs may be applied to a 
great number of conflicts, provided that one is capable to assimilate 
the attitudes of the two opponents to the “military” attitude and 
the “non-violent” one, respectively.25 
5th improvement: There are four MoCRs, which are mutually 
incommensurable. The non-violent one and the military one are 
the most important ones.
8. Sixth improvement: Two alternative ways of arguing 
about conflict resolution 
Several scholars reduce the motivations –which concern even a 
deep level of a personality– to material issues; i.e. they understand 
the motivations of both parties in terms of basic needs only. Surely, 
the choice to deal with only basic needs simplifies the representation 
of a conflict; one obtains the theoretical advantage of referring to 
objective issues, belonging to an almost closed domain that may be 
described in almost mechanical terms so that one can calculate on 
them by deduction from some hypotheses. This choice leads to fol-
low the deductive method (OA) expressed by a calculation of what 
one considers a need, even an unbounded one; in sum according to 
a specific couple of choices on the two dichotomies: AI and AO.
This philosophy parallels the current behaviour of the juridical 
institutions, which calculate the degree of seriousness of a commit-
ted illegal act and then calculate the correspondent degree of the 
23 These two propositions parallel the propositions suggested by Koyré for sum-
marizing the two scientific attitudes in conflict during the birth of modern science. 
A. Koyré: From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe, U. Maryland P., Baltimore, 1957. 
“Interpretazione delle frasi caratteristiche di Koyré e loro estensione alla storia della 
fisica dell’ottocento”, in C. Vinti (ed.): Alexandre Koyré. L’avventura intellettuale, ESI, 
Napoli, 1994, 657-691. 
24 F. Fornari: Psychoanalysis of War (orig. 1966), Anchor Press/Doubleday, Norwell, 
MA, 1974.
25 The well-known prisoner’s dilemma presents a conflict between an egocentric 
attitude and a cooperative attitude. See A. Rapoport: Strategy and Consciousness, op. 
cit., ch. I.
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punishment. This formal way to tackle a conflict parallels a math-
ematical calculation, where all questions are decided according to 
Leibniz’s motto, which would represent the best method for the 
resolutions of all conflicts: “Calculemus!”, i.e. science before ethics 
(and hence, before a personal involvement). A popular game, chess, 
represents this kind of CR. 
Yet, Leibniz suggested this method as not more than an ideal one. 
Moreover, Goedel’s results deny it: no scientific theory (of conflict 
too) is consistent and complete. Furthermore, we saw in Table 1 of 
sect. 2 that a Court takes in account little more than one out the 
three aspects of a conflict. All that leads to the conclusion that the 
above mentioned reduction of assumptions to needs constitutes an 
amputation of an adequate theory of CR. 
The wisdom of the pacifist Leibniz was another one. From his 
personal attempts to conciliate different states and different religions, 
all unsuccessful, he learnt that no calculation is sufficient to con-
ciliate two radical opponents. Indeed, two centuries after, Leibniz’s 
reconciliation practice –relying on ethics rather than calculations– 
was renewed at the highest levels by a non-Western man, Gandhi, 
who obtained glorious successes. By resolving several conflicts, he 
successfully started a radical change in both his religion and his 
society, and he promoted a successful revolution for India’s libera-
tion from the British rule.
His success leads us to consider a crucial innovation of his ethical 
action for solving conflicts.
Gandhi’s revolution was bravely based upon a word: “non-vio-
lence” which is odd with respect to Western culture. It is not a 
positive word. For a comparison, recall that Christianity relies upon 
the word “love”, Liberalism upon “freedom”, Socialism upon “jus-
tice”, etc. Hence, this word “non-violence” represents a great nov-
elty in the dominant thinking of the Western tradition. 
Let us scrutinize it. It is not a negative word, as the initial word 
“non” suggests, because “violence” is a negative word too; hence, 
the word joining the above two is a double negation.26 In addition, 
it cannot be equated to a corresponding positive word, such as love, 
benevolence, care, etc. (unsuccessfully Gandhi tried to substitute 
Satyagraha for it), because it does not represent a thing, an idea, a 
feeling, but a method that one chooses to follow without establish-
26 Here, and in the following I underline the two negative words of a doubly ne-
gated proposition in order to facilitate the reader recognizing it.
82
Ars Brevis 2015Antonino DrAgo
ing nothing more than a prohibition: no to violence. In sum, the 
word “non-violence” is a double negation without a corresponding 
positive word. The same holds true for the word “non-killing”. 
Notice that also a Court sometimes states a double negation: “not 
guilty”, i.e. “no conclusive evidence of guilt has been obtained”; 
this proposition does not mean “He did not commit an illegal act”; 
i.e. this proposition is not equivalent to the corresponding affirma-
tive one, since the latter proposition lacks empirical evidence (DNP). 
In this case, it is not true that “two negations affirm”, as people 
usually say; rather the logical double negation law fails. 
In the last century the mathematical logicians obtained a crucial 
result about logic, understood in the most general sense. They 
stated that the double negation law constitutes the best borderline 
between classical logic and almost all kinds of non-classical logic; 
when this law fails, the logic is a non-classical one, first of all, the 
intuitionist one.27 In other words, we have to take in account a di-
chotomy in the foundations of logic: in Classical logic ¬¬ A = A holds 
true: “Two negations affirm”; in Non-classical logic ¬¬ A = A does not 
hold true: “Two negations do not affirm”. These two cases –of valid-
ity or failure of the double negation law– constitute the sharpest 
dichotomy possible.28 
As a consequence, by itself the word “non-violence” leads to argue 
within a completely different logical world from the traditional 
Western one, which extensively and exclusively made use of classi-
cal logic. This fact substantiates the radical nature of the alternative 
introduced by the word “non-violence” into the conflict of Indian 
people with Western civilisation; it introduced a change even in the 
most abstract product of the collective mind, i.e. (mathematical) 
logic. 
In the previous sect. 5, I emphasized the non-violent content of 
the above three theories. In order to inspect whether they share the 
27 D. Prawitz and P.-E. Malmnaass. “A survey of some connections between classi-
cal, intuitionistic and minimal logic”, in A. Schuette et al. (Eds.): Contributions to 
Mathematical Logic, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1968, 215-230; M. Dummett: Elements 
of Intuitionism, Oxford U.P., Oxford, 1977.
28 Let us notice that an old and rooted prejudice of English linguists prevents to 
apply this result to the analyzed texts and more in general scientific theories; accord-
ing to this prejudice the use of double negations is a characteristic feature of primitive 
languages. See L.R. Horn (2001), “The Logic of Logical Double Negation” Proc. Sophia 
Symposium on Negation, Tokyo, U. of Sophia, 79-112. Instead, we will see that it is very 
important to analyze the original presentations of (scientific) theories through their 
DNPs. This analysis leads to recognize an alternative formal arguing and even the 
model of an alternative organisation of a scientific theory to the deductive one. 
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characteristic feature of the word non-violence, i.e. whether they 
make use of DNPs, I scrutinised a methodological paper of Freud’s, 
the first book of Marx’s Capital and Clausewitz’s book, i.e. the 
original texts presenting their theories. In fact, in each one of them 
the DNPs result to be numerous. 
The best instance is Freud’s theory. In a celebrated methodological 
paper, he suggested to an analyst how to solve a patient’s psychical 
conflict by starting to interpret the patient’s dreams. The analyst 
obtains the key for recognising a patient’s trauma by negating that 
negated proposition which the patient says when he is recalling a 
dream. When the Patient says: “I did not want to kill my mother”, 
the Analyst has to add a negation: “It is not true that he did not 
want to kill his mother”. The latter proposition is not equivalent to 
the corresponding affirmative proposition, since it lacks empirical 
evidence.29 
Furthermore, one can easily summarize Marx’s theory through his 
essential DNPs. It relies on the methodological principle of “negat-
ing the negation”.30 Moreover, his characteristic propositions are 
the following DNPs: Capitalism is a social process of an un-bound-
ed growth. It is not that the proletariat is a mere commodity. It is 
not true that the proletarian class cannot overcome capitalism.
Also Clausewitz’s military strategy essentially relies on DNPs. In 
his opinion, the total war for “abating the enemy” (i.e. according to 
classical logic: win/lose) almost never occurs. Indeed, it is bounded 
by non-military factors, mainly the political one; this “real war” 
really occurs. Hence in Clausewitz’s book the starting methodo-
logical principle of his theory is his celebrated proposition, in fact 
a DNP: “War is nothing else than politics through different 
29 S. Freud: “On Negation” (orig. 1925), http://www.valas.fr/IMG/pdf/Freud_Com-
plete_Works.pdf, pp. 4128-4143. Actually Freud wrote: “(Patient:) ‘It’s not my mother.’ 
We emend this to: ‘So it is his mother.’ In our interpretation, we take the liberty of 
disregarding the negation and of picking out the subject-matter alone of the associa-
tion.” I interpret this Freud’s conclusion as a mistake, since he ignored non-classical 
logic; indeed, the entire paper explains that he does not disregard the Patient’s nega-
tion, rather he adds a negation for obtaining the following methodological principle: 
“It is not true that it is not the mother”. Indeed, after the quoted proposition, Freud 
elaborates on the subject of the mother not in a deductive way, but in an inductive 
way. A. Drago and E. Zerbino: “Sull’interpretazione metodologica del discorso freudia-
no”, Riv. Psicol., Neurol. e Psichiatria, 57 (1996) 539-566.
30 Marx wanted to argue through a new dialectical process. In fact, he was unsuc-
cessful in his looking for a general dialectical method “turning up Hegel’s dialectics 
in order to put it on its feet”. However, his dialectical process was not bounded –as 
Hegel’s is– to elaborate three versions –the affirmative, the negative and the doubly 
negated ones– of a same word or statement, but it is composed by chains of arguments.
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means”;31 (Notice that he never wrote the corresponding affirmative 
proposition which is attributed to him by ignorance of his text: “War 
is politics through different means”.) His DNP means that the 
military strategist has to mainly manage the relationship politics/
military and at last all depends on which relationship between the 
military and politics the strategist establishes.32
As in Clausewitz’s text, also in the original text of each of the 
other two theories the sequence of DNPs is enough to preserve the 
logical thread of his theory. Manifestly, the failure of the double 
negation law is a common logical feature of the original writings 
illustrating these theories. We have to conclude that the above 
theories have been illustrated by means of a systematic use of DNPs. 
This common feature implies that the systematic organisation of 
each of the above theories is different from the deductive one, which 
is developed according to classical logic by starting from few postu-
lates-axioms (AO). It is easy to recognize that the validity of the 
double negation law –equivalent to the validity of the law of the 
excluded middle– is necessary to a deductive organization of a 
theory, otherwise each deduction remains dubious. Hence, this law 
manages an AO theory. Instead, in the case a theory aimed to solve 
a problem by looking for a new, still unknown method, the arguing 
has to remain open to innovations; hence, between the true and the 
false a third possibility has to be allowed and the law of the ex-
cluded middle –and equivalently, the double negation law– fails. In 
conclusion, the non-classical logic manages a PO theory. 
Indeed, by sharing the same choice PO, all the three theories are 
essentially based on the use of DNPs of non-classical logic. 
6th improvement: The aspect A of a MoCR includes a neat di-
chotomy about the kind of logic, which is linked to the dichotomy 
on the kind of organization.
31 K. von Clausewitz: “Warning“ in On War, op. cit.
32 By recognising his logical method, some relevant results are obtained. First, his 
mass of cumbersome and rhapsodic aphorisms is clarified so that his whole illustration 
is summarised by means of a mere well-ordering of those DNPs concerning his main 
points. Second, in such a summarised illustration of the theory the core of his strate-
gic theory is circumscribed in accurate terms. Third, Clausewitz’s illustration of the 
relationship between the two basic forms of a war, the “absolute war” and the “real 
war”, is formalised by means of the relationship between the affirmative classical 
logic and a non-classical logic of the DNPs. His managing two kinds of logic gives 
reason of the high degree of sophistication of Clausewitz’s thinking. A. Drago and F. 
Pezzullo: “Logica e strategia. Analisi della teoria di K. Von Clausewitz”, Teoria Politica, 
16 (2000) 164-174.
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This fact introduces –in agreement with a tolerant, non-violent 
attitude– a basic pluralism in the foundations of both the science 
and theory of CR. A remarkable result follows. Being also a logical 
conflict, a social conflict represents a more radical conflict than those 
considered in the literature. It is not a case that some years ago the 
category of “intractable” conflict was introduced.33 In order to solve 
these conflicts one has to take in account that there is a bridge be-
tween classical logic and intuitionist logic; it is given by the “nega-
tive translation”, actually a suitable adjunction of double negations 
to each classical proposition in order to obtain the corresponding 
intuitionist one.34 The inverse translation from the intuitionist 
logic to the classical logic –i.e. from a DNP to the corresponding 
affirmative proposition– essentially appeals to the principle of suf-
ficient reason, i.e. a logical jump, not justified by any mechanical 
rule. Also in mathematical logic the incommensurability cannot be 
overcome.
9. Seventh improvement: The theory of non-violent 
resolution of the interpersonal conflict as an application 
of the previous theories
Freud, Marx and Clausewitz produced their theories for specific 
reasons which were extraneous from the non-violent method of CR. 
By covering the intimate conflict, the social conflict and the mass 
military conflict, they all together did not cover a kind of conflict 
– that of the interpersonal level. Yet it is the most interesting one 
for a beginner wanting to both better understand and try to apply 
the new method of not suppressing the adversary. Even the non-
violent teachers –Tolstoy, Gandhi, Lanza del Vasto, Galtung, etc.–, 
although in their lives they were capable to non-violently solve 
difficult conflicts, were unable to derive from their basic assumptions 
a theory of this kind of conflict. 
33 O. Ramsbotham, H. Miall, T. Woodhouse: Contemporary Conflict Resolution. Pol-
ity, London, 2011. For this reason most scholars try to simplify their task by selecting 
the conflicts without incommensurabilities. Instead, Western experience of great 
conflicts regards exactly such a case of conflict: Crusades, inter-Christians wars, French 
revolution motivated by the ideology of the human rights, WW2 motivated by a rac-
ist ideology.
34 A. Troelstra, D. van Dalen: Constructivism in Mathematics, North-Holland, Am-
sterdam, 1988, pp. 56ff.
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Actually, it was too hard to be rationalized, because there are three 
difficulties, a subjective, an objective and a structural one. 1) In such 
a kind of conflict there is no separation between the object of study 
and the scholar; the same person who theorizes unwarily inclines 
to identify himself with one of the two opponents. 2) In this kind 
of conflict the third actor, the civil law, is radically different from 
the other two actors, who are two persons; it is difficult to take into 
account the interaction between persons and formal law. 3) We saw 
in the previous sect. that the rationalization of also this kind of 
conflict had to discover the non-classical arguing, which is unknown 
in the common use of language; only Lanza del Vasto foresaw a new 
kind of logic, suitable for theorizing CR.35
In the above we recognised this kind of logic and its corresponding 
organization of a theory (PO). Let us add a further feature of this 
specific arguing. 
Each author of a PO theory offers arguments which eventually 
achieve a final ad absurdum proof, whose conclusion is a doubly 
negated predicate of a universal nature; it concerns the problem and 
the related problems that the theory wants to solve. In science, the 
best instance of this kind of proof is the celebrated ad absurdum proof 
of S. Carnot’s –currently taught to first-year undergraduate students 
of scientific courses–; it concludes the new method for establishing 
the main result of thermodynamic theory (i.e. it suggests the high-
est efficiency function in heat/work conversions). 
Both Marx and Clausewitz present this kind of logical proof 
through the keyword “otherwise” or a similar word.36 In addition I 
recognized several DNPs and ad absurdum arguments in celebrated 
Gandhi’s writings which suggested the non-violent way to resolve 
35 Lanza del Vasto: La Trinité Spirituelle, Denoël, Paris, 1971, p. 77-78: “... a Novis-
simum Organon, or Supreme Logic, the suitable logic for the Reconciliation Philosophy. 
Its basic law is that the opposites, the contraries join together at infinity. ... three centuries 
before Kant the ‘divine Cusanus’ laid its bases in a book titled De Docta Ignorantia. I 
am to give an instance of application of this method...”. Also in a subsequent paper 
(“Un, Deux, Trois” (orig. 1079-80), Les Quatre Piliers de la Paix, Rocher, Monaco, 1992, 
pp. 93-94) his vision of non-violent CR referred to Cusanus’ way of overcoming the 
contradiction of the opposites; through this logical process, Cusanus deliberately 
wanted to achieve a non-Aristotelian logic, where the law of the excluded middle fails. 
Already in 1929, E. Cassirer stated that Cusanus started a new kind of logic. See my 
paper: “Dialectics in Cusanus (1401-1464), Lanza del Vasto (1901-1981) and beyond”, 
Epistemologia, 33 (2010) 305-328. 
36 E.g. K. Clausewitz: On War, op. cit., 1.1.23 and 2.8 vi b). Instead Freud, by hav-
ing eliminated the double negation of the correct conclusion “It is not true that it is 
not the mother”, did not include the ad absurdum proofs of non-classical logic. 
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the main conflict of his society, i.e. the struggle for India’s political 
independence from the British Rule.37 
The conclusion of this kind of arguing is manifested in the scien-
tific theories only, since only they require a rigorous logical path. 
An author of a PO scientific theory, after having obtained the con-
clusive universal predicate, a DNP, changes it by implicitly appealing 
to the principle of sufficient reason; indeed, the evidence accumu-
lated by previous non-classical arguments is evaluated by the author 
as sufficient for jumping to the affirmative corresponding proposi-
tion, to be then tested against experiments. 
Now we are in the position of exploiting the past theoretical ex-
perience of CR for obtaining a new result, concerning the method 
of non-violent CR at interpersonal level.
Among all the above theories, Freud’s illustrates a non-violent 
method for CR. This method includes four steps, to which I add 
three more steps suggested by the experience of scientific theories.38
i)  Deny the malevolence of the Patient.
ii)   Pay attention to a Patient’s crucial negation, in order to add 
one more negation to it, so that a DNP is obtained: It is not 
true that the Patient did not experience a trauma X. 
iii)   Take this DNP as an adjunction to the Patient’s situation, i.e. 
a guess on how to argue and interact with the Patient.
iv)   Reiterate the previous two steps in order to accumulate as much 
evidence as possible about the guess.
v)   Organize such evidence in order to obtain an ad absurdum 
proof concluding as follows: It is impossible that he did not 
experience the trauma X.
vi)   Appeal to the principle of sufficient reason for jumping from 
this DPN to the corresponding affirmative proposition: “The 
Patient experienced the trauma X”.
vii)  Dialogue with the Patient on the basis of this proposition in 
order to deduce the way to establish a bridge between the 
Patient’s Ego and Id about X. 
37 A. Drago: “Hind Swaraj: A birth of a new model of development”, in Silby K. 
Joseph and B. Mohandaya (Eds.): “Reflections on Hind Swaraj”, Inst. Gandhian Studies 
and Gandhi International, Wardha, 2011, pp. 73-143. 
38 Indeed, a PI and PO scientific theory is developed in a parallel way. See A. 
Drago: “Pluralism in Logic: The Square of Opposition, Leibniz’s Principle of Sufficient 
Reason and Markov’s principle”, in J.-Y. Béziau and D. Jacquette (Eds.): Around and 
Beyond the Square of Opposition, Birkhaueser, Basel 2012, pp. 175-189.
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What is an adjunction? Exactly the same word “adjunction” occurs 
in the following scientific theories: L. Carnot’s mechanics (geo-
metrical motions), L. Carnot’s geometry and strategy (displacements 
by insensible degrees), L. Carnot’s calculus (variables which are 
continuously changing; they are usually called infinitesimals), Ga-
lois’ theory of algebraic equations; and also some philosophies: Kant’s 
philosophy of a basic ethical act,39 intended as an adjunction for 
overcoming the inaccessibility of the noumenos by our minds, Hegel’s 
Aufhebung, Capitini’s main step of a non-violent method for RC.40 
Also Galtung repeats the same word to illustrate his method for CR, 
called by him Transcend41 (English translation of Aufhebung), i.e. a 
process transcending the initial situation thanks to the addition of 
an adjunction.
This creative act may be further qualified by means of the theory 
of games. It considers four kinds of games: outburst game, imitation 
game, game under rules, gamble.42 In the interpersonal relationships, 
the above four kinds of games correspond to dialogue, an empa-
thetic move, to appeal to the opponent’s interests, and to take ad-
vantage from casual events, respectively. For instance, in Freud’s 
psychoanalysis, the Patient plays both an outburst game (a dialog 
with the Analyst) and a game of the mimesis (transfer with the 
Analyst); on the other hand, the Analyst plays both the game of a 
dialogue and gamble (he catches the Patient’s negations). The two 
actors play different games, only the dialogue is a common game.
Inside an interpersonal conflict, the two actors are objectively 
similar; hence, the game has to be the same for both. The paralyzing 
situation induced by a threat has to be overcome by inviting the 
opponent to play a game, since notoriously a game is at the origin 
of each social institution; hence also the new interpersonal agree-
39 I. Kant: “On the Saying: ‘This May be True in Theory, but it does not Apply in 
Practice”, in Hans Reiss, Ed., Kant: Political Writings, Cambridge U. P., Cambridge, 1991. 
Also https://hesperusisbosphorus.files.wordpress.com/2015/02/theory-and-practice.
pdf.
40 Aldo Capitini, the first European non-violent person, put this point as the 
foundation of his philosophy of non-violence. “L’avvenire della dialettica”, Rivista di 
Filosofia, 1, 1959, 224-230.
41 J. Galtung: Peace ..., op. cit., sect. 3.5.
42 R. Caillois: Man, Play and Games (orig. 1958), Free Press of Glencoe, New York 
1961. I prefer Lanza del Vasto’s names of this classification (Les Quatre Fléaux, Denoël, 
Paris, pp. 45-47) because this author separates the four kinds of game in two couples 
of games which correspond to the two dichotomies; hence the four kinds of games 
correspond to the four MoCRs. 
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ment to be established in the social life is based on a specific game; 
the adjunction results to be an attempt to engage an opponent in 
playing a game. 
More in general, the creativity in the interpersonal kind of CR 
mainly consists in choosing a first game and then in playing all 
possible games in order to accumulate as much evidence as possible 
to achieve an ad absurdum proof on the opponent’s characteristic 
features –either his motivations, or his traumas, or his positive feel-
ings.
We are now in the position to obtain as a particular result the ap-
plication of Freud’s improved method to the specific kind of conflict 
in the interpersonal relationships –not considered by the previous 
theories– when it is resolved according to a non-violent attitude: 
i)  As the basic methodological principle, deny that the opponent 
is an enemy. 
ii)  In the aim to interact with the opponent, transform the given 
conflict situation by adding an adjunction – e.g. an empa-
thetic move, a surprising move, a voluntary sacrifice, etc., 
aimed to play a game. 
iii)  Exploit the adjunction for inducing how to start to play games 
with the opponent. 
iv)  Exploit the resulting interaction for obtaining an insight in 
the opponent’s motivations. 
v)  Reiterate the above two steps until obtaining an ad absurdum 
proof whose conclusion is a general proposition on the pos-
sible behaviours of the opponent (“It is impossible that the 
opponent will not agree on...”).
vi)  By appealing to the principle of sufficient reason, translate this 
proposition to its affirmative version, i.e. “The opponent is 
inclined to agree on...”
vii)  From it, derive the correct moves for achieving a conflict set-
tlement. 
The addition of a theory of CR of this kind of conflict completes 
an initial general theory of CR at all social levels. 
 
Conclusions 
It is two centuries that some European scholars –Freud, Marx and 
Clausewitz– led to enter in a theorization of (almost) non-violent 
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methods for CR. They introduced a triadic conception of the reality 
of conflicts and at last the entire reality. 
Outside Europe, in the 20th century, the theory of an explicitly 
non-violent method of CR gradually grew from ethical positions 
(Tolstoy’s, Gandhi’s and M.L. King’s as well) to philosophical world 
views such as those of Capitini and Lanza del Vasto, and to political 
theories such as those of Lanza del Vasto and Galtung, who started 
a structural thinking about society and political life. 
As a matter of fact, the challenge to qualify non-violence in intel-
lectual terms of a structural kind was a hard task. Indeed, Western 
civilisation led human reason, on one hand, to conciliate in an uni-
tarian, organicistic scheme the various scientific theories on all kinds 
of reality, and on the other hand to maintain as an inescapable 
necessity (at least, in extreme circumstances) to resolve social conflicts 
by severing persons, or even suppressing them. On the contrary, the 
non-violent teachers –in particular, Gandhi– addressed human rea-
son, on one hand, to consider as an inescapable ethical task to 
conciliate conflicting persons, by viewing all them inside an organicis-
tic, global unity, constituting the only true reality; on the other hand, 
by means of the word non-violence he introduced a basic intellec-
tual dichotomy in the Western rationality –as first logic–, and hence a 
conflict inside science. Recall that Gandhi stated that “non-violence 
is a science”, of course of an alternative kind to the dominant one.43
This change in attitude put into practice what Kant first proposed 
and Capitini then reiterated as his basic tenet. In fact, we are expe-
riencing a paradigm shift in traditional rationality, i.e. a conversion 
of Western philosophical reason from the searching of the “noume-
nos” to an ethical attitude of giving a positive adjunction to the 
reality, i.e. non-violence. Remarkably, this introduction in struc- 
tural terms of ethics into politics at last has overcome Machiavelli’s 
ideology of separating ethics from politics. 
As a conclusion, the word “non-violence” generated a new way of 
thinking –that through non-classical logic–, and changed human 
life in such a deep way to discover a new CR. All in the above con-
firms what Lanza del Vasto wrote half a century ago: 
43 I developed this suggestion by the papers: “When History of science suggests 
Non-violence”. Int. J. Nonviolence, 3 (1996-97), pp. 15-21; “A paradigm shift in conflict 
resolution: War and peace from a history of science viewpoint”, P. Koller, H. Puhl 
(Eds.): Current Issues in Political Philosophy. 19th Int. Wittgenstein Symposium, Kirchberg, 
1996, pp. 106-114. “Non-violence as a science of conflict resolution”, Anuvibha Re-
porter, Dec. 2000, 5, pp. 111-116; “La Paix dans la Science”, Alliage, n.- 66 April 2010, 
17-25.
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“The two greatest discoveries of the Century are: Non-violen-
ce and the Atomic bomb.”44 
Antonino Drago 
Formerly at Naples University “Federico II” 
drago@unina.it
[Article aprovat per a la seva publicació el febrer de 2016]
44 Lanza del Vasto: Les quatre Fléaux, op. cit. p. 293. 
